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Abstract 
Talking about, and learning lessons from The American War in Vietnam can be a process whose 
genuine engagement requires a suspension—even if temporary—of moral and cultural biases 
that are embedded in the Western mindset. This research project is one that composes military 
strategy, government rhetoric, and very human accounts of war in Vietnam in order to 
understand how people in Hanoi experience and talk about war, with an ultimate aim of making 
some of these stories and lessons digestible to a Western audience. 
My findings discuss some key components of the North Vietnamese mindset towards the 
American War in Vietnam: the relevant historical context regarding foreign occupation, 
patriotism and unity, duty and defense, and some overall effects of attacks and bombs, with a 
deeper focus on what I found to be the most important aspect: unity. I then compare the picture 
of this mindset with some respective elements of the U.S American wartime mentality. The 
ultimate pursuit of this research is increased understanding and diplomacy between nationalities 
and philosophies, as well as advocacy for human-oriented analysis of international conflicts in 
general. 
This is a project oriented towards epistemology and constructivism. A constructivist approach to 
studying war is a human approach to studying war, and it is one that helps us to understand the 
true impact of governmental decisions that might seem distant to us. Analysis of war without 
adequate attention to the human dimension, at its worst, risks uninformed policy decisions and 
inaccurate historical analysis. 
Key words: American War in Vietnam, Vietnam War, government rhetoric, propaganda, 
“People’s War,” Communism, Eastern philosophy, collectivism, individualism, morale. 
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A Note on Word Choice 
As one component of my study is word choice and word usage, I will take a moment to clarify 
some vocabulary choices. To refer to concepts, events, groups, or ideas in general—when I am 
not pointing to a particular political agenda or perspective—I will attempt to use the clearest 
word choice available.  
 
-American War in Vietnam: This is the term I will use to describe the war between Vietnam 
and the United States from 1955 to 1975. 
-North Vietnamese Army: Rather than Viet Minh, People’s Army of Vietnam, or other names, 
North Vietnamese Army provides the most direct reference to the army that fought for this 
region.  
-Viet Cong: I will use this terminology to refer to the resistance army in South Vietnam, to 
distinguish them from the pro-American forces and the North Vietnamese Army. 
-propaganda: This is not a note on a specific word choice, but more a note on acknowledging 
biases. Propaganda is frequently talked about in a negative light in popular US discourse, but it is 
important to remember to contextualize propaganda and recall that the US also engages in the 






(Image 1.1-American War Propaganda Poster-Krueger, Gitter, Beiswenger) 
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Introduction 
“The human factors of the insurgency were therefore understood only in an impressionistic and 
intuitive fashion. This was bound to affect policy decisions with respect to counter-insurgency.” 
-1965 Report by Rand Group on Viet Cong Motivation 
 
“…because the popular view of the Vietnam War focuses on Americans in combat…it is 
fundamentally ahistorical.” 
-Michael Hunt, A Vietnam War Reader 
 
 As a Western citizen, it is no small task to attempt to understand and empathize with an 
Eastern-influenced mindset. Our bias can transcend mere differences in lifestyle. As David Black 
(n.d) notes, Westerners might hold complicated, deep biases in areas such as “privileging the 
agenda of the self” and “trusting history less than change.” These kinds of biases can seem 
impossible to translate and navigate. Therefore, a reasonable approach to foster understanding, is 
a full—even if temporary—attempt at immersion into another’s mindset and philosophy. This 
immersion is particularly pertinent in the case of the American War in Vietnam. Understanding a 
historical period so controversial that much of its basic terminology risks bias requires a careful 
and patient analysis of perspectives besides our own.  
 Empathy towards an Eastern mindset can be described using the literary term “suspension 
of disbelief.” This term is defined as “a willingness to suspend one's critical faculties and believe 
the unbelievable; sacrifice of realism and logic for the sake of enjoyment.” (Dictionary.com) I 
have reframed this definition to suit this project: “a willingness to suspend one's critical faculties 
and understand the uncomfortable; sacrifice of moral bias for the sake of understanding.” As 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge once grappled with our ability to empathize with fictional characters, 
so too can we call upon this impetus now, to empathize with those who see the world differently 
from we do. To try and see clearly this information and logic is a critical first step to 
understanding a historical event whose retellings are often mired in political sentiment. 
 It was from this philosophy that I crafted my research proposal. I acknowledge that there 
is something untraditional about fitting a somewhat philosophical approach into a standard 
research format. Some of my findings are, by definition, subjective. To gather insight on the 
human dimension of war in Vietnam requires loosening a reliance on “hard facts,” commonly 
told histories, or instincts to judge based on our own understandings of morality. Much of the 
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human dimension of war was not lived out in the realms of international politics or historical 
“truths”.  
 This is a project oriented towards epistemology and constructivism. A constructivist 
approach to war is a human approach to war, and it is one that helps us to understand the true 
impact of governmental decisions that might seem distant to us. To challenge how we in the U.S 
know what we know can produce moving results: a recognition of the forces that shape our 
understanding of the world. I have chosen rhetoric as my means to exploring an epistemological 
and constructivist approach; words play a significant role in how we decide what we know, and 
how we construct our meanings and narratives of our world. This logic will gain meaning as it is 
further contextualized in this study. 
 Delving into the perspective of the citizenry of Vietnam did not always prove to be 
straightforward. As I am working in a country with a strong centralized government where 
freedom of speech is not a given, it is hard to define or capture what a “true Vietnamese 
perspective” means. Yet, when I turned towards literature, eager to understand the role of 
Vietnamese propaganda and government control of the national conversation, I realized that my 
pursuit might be more possible than I once thought. The pervasive impact of patriotic 
propaganda in Vietnam showed me that the party or government perspective the war often did 
shed light on the people’s opinion of it. And, by temporarily suspending my bias toward total 
freedom of thought, I gained more insight into the Vietnamese mindset. 
 I began to see that warring with America prompted the Communist Party to adopt a 
tactical way of looking at truth and at patriotism, viewing the national mindset as a deeply 
important aspect of strategy when facing a foe with superior technology and greater material 
resources. How does a government mobilize a people to machine-like efficiency and dedication 
without forcing them to sacrifice their humanity and community? By divorcing analysis of the 
American War in Vietnam from political sentiment, a very human account of strategy and tough 
choices began to materialize.  
 During a focus group, one North Vietnamese Army veteran asked me what could be done 
to stop war from happening. He wondered if I understood the gravity and complexity of what I 
was asking: how could I question people about what they “thought” of war? I responded with the 
best answer I could—the core of this research topic—increased understanding, empathy, and 
dialogue between people. If nothing else, I hope this research project achieves the goals of 
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humanizing the North Vietnamese perspective of the American War in Vietnam and prompting 
Western readers to practice some empathy towards life during this time. Oftentimes, we allow 
legitimate concerns of seemingly incompatible mindsets to hinder us from exercising the 
compassion of which we might be capable. Or, if “compassion” and “empathy” seem to be too 
loaded of terms to talk about this bloody era, perhaps frame this exploration around increased 
understanding; for no diplomatic goals can be responsibly considered without some degree of 
mutual understanding. 
 The body of my research will be organized thusly: I will begin with a briefing on 
Vietnam’s relevant history for the past few centuries to provide context; I will then move into 
presenting some important philosophical elements of the North Vietnamese mindset in light of 
my literature. First, following up on the relevant history, I will offer some findings on the impact 
of foreign occupation on the Vietnamese mindset, and how these historical realities often served 
to motivate and unify Hanoians. I will then go deeper into this idea of unity in Vietnam, mostly 
focusing on the deliberate actions by the Communist Party to foster ideological unity amongst 
Vietnamese people. Next, I will note the devastating impact of bombs and destruction to 
ultimately support an the undeniable spirit of duty and defense amongst the North Vietnamese. 
These sections will provide a baseline but holistic view of the North Vietnamese war mindset, 
which I will briefly contrast with the respective American war mindset. The Data and Analysis 
section will follow a similar pattern, pausing for deeper reflection on the terms nhân dân, hy 
sinh, and Cuộc kháng chiến chống Mỹ, cứu nước and spending more time reflecting on rhetoric 
in general. 
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Methodology 
 The overall outline and scheduling of my research required some flexibility, particularly 
in that my in-depth interviews occurred earlier than intended. However, these interviews with Vu 
The Long and Le Van Lan proved to be quite helpful in framing my subsequent research. From 
talking to Le Van Lan, I picked up some key words and phrases as well as insight into the very 
deliberate and open use of propaganda by the Vietnamese government. From speaking with Vu 
The Long, I learned about the material dimension of life during this time and gained another 
valuable war narrative.  
 My original research questions and survey drafts prompted respondents to explain their 
experiences with and thoughts on war in general. However, it quickly became clear, perhaps 
because I am American, that my interviewees and survey respondents had the most to say about 
the American War in Vietnam. While my initial proposal was not framed around this war 
exclusively, focusing on it has been beneficial when performing research on this scale and within 
this timeframe. 
 It was from the mindset of exploring the human dimension of war that I developed my 
research methods. After conducting my in-depth interviews, I began drafting my initial survey. I 
administered a detailed written survey to a group of Hanoians above 50 years of age and 
facilitated a focus group. I then administered a shorter oral questionnaire to random participants 
at Hoan Kiem Lake.I gathered key quotes and anecdotal evidence from these sessions which I 
viewed alongside my literature. 
Written Survey and Focus Group 
 The first type of survey I developed was to be answered in writing. It was longer than my 
later draft and was designed for people with whom I could not communicate in English. 
Admittedly, this earlier version and the responses it garnered helped me make edits on the 
random oral survey I later administered. This written survey version was given to a group of 9 
adults that were over 50. This group was formed through convenience sampling. I had this 
survey translated into Vietnamese and allowed the participants to fill in their responses. A 
picture of this survey is on the following page.  
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(Figure 1.1- In-depth Written Survey) 
 This survey is divided into three parts. Part I focuses on war in general. This is also the 
section of the survey where I sought to learn more about how the government talks about 
wartime adversaries. Part II asks for reflection and memories of a single war (most chose to talk 
about the war with America). Part III asks for open-ended wartime connotations of the words 
nhân dân, hy sinh and Cuộc kháng chiến chống Mỹ, cứu nước. To my surprise and appreciation, 
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what was intended to be a written survey session also turned in to a focus group. I gained much 
insight about life during war as well as Vietnamese mentalities from this group, which included 
two veterans of the American War in Vietnam. Quotes and anecdotes I learned in this session are 
analyzed in the Data section. 
Random Oral Survey 
 When discussing any topic relating to history in Vietnam, a respondent’s age makes an 
undeniable impact on their response. This notion has been confirmed to me through discussion 
with Vietnamese of many ages as well as a small-scale case study on high school education in 
Da Lat. Therefore, for my surveying, I chose to create quotas for different age ranges. They 
original quotas are as follows. 
Child (5- 10 people) 
Young adult (age 15-30, 15 people) 
Middle adult (age 30-50, 15 people) 
Older adult (age 50+, 15 people) 
 I developed the age divisions of these brackets with help of a student at Hanoi University. 
We agreed upon these age brackets because of respondents’ life experiences in regards to war. 
For example, people in the “older adult” age group were all born during or before the year 1966, 
meaning they were all alive during the American War in Vietnam and Chinese border wars. 
Additionally, some of the older correspondents in this group had memories to share of the French 
occupation period. Middle and young adults were either not alive or too young for a full 
comprehension of human affairs during this war, though their insight was valuable for 
discovering the impacts of war on the mindsets of subsequent generations. 
 This breakdown was helpful in initially approaching surveying, but I did not end up 
completing my surveying as I had originally planned. As we attempted the survey with children, 
it became evident that many of the questions were too complicated for a child to answer, and 
engaging with this age bracket would likely require development of a new survey draft. 
Therefore, in order to keep this project feasible under the time constraints, I shifted my focus to 
the older age groups. Additionally, due to an unexpected hindrance on my interpreter’s ability to 
meet for surveying, I was only able to gather 26 oral surveys instead of my expected number: 45. 
Of the 26, I spoke to ten young adults, ten middle age adults, and six older adults. 
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 As my topic is less concerned with pursuing a completely accurate narrative and more 
oriented towards with the popular narrative (which is not to say the popular narrative is 
inaccurate), I felt the purpose of my survey was to get a sense of how people in Vietnam talk 
about war, and ideally view this alongside some narratives of the Communist Party. Rather than 
collecting quantitative data for statistical analysis, I chose to design my random surveys so that 
the respondents would be able to speak freely and at length. I have included an image of both 
pages of my random survey:  
  
(Figure 1.2- Random Oral Survey) 
 I conducted this survey at Hoan Kiem Lake and at Nguyen Linh’s residence, both located 
in Hanoi. No names of participants were recorded, and all refusal to take the survey or refusal to 
answer any questions was respected.   
 The survey is divided into 3 parts. Part I was an effort to understand the impact of war on 
the individual respondent’s life and allow the participant to enter the mindset of thinking about 
war. Part II of the survey gave the opportunity for more in-depth reflection on a specific 
experience of a war, and also included a very important and telling question: what do you think 
was the strongest part of Northern Vietnam’s strategy during this war?  
 Part III delved more into the Vietnamese mindset, attempting to gain understanding about 
how Vietnamese people talk about themselves and their lives during wartime. The phrases I 
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asked about, nhân dân, hy sinh, and later dân tộc came to me through reading Vietnam at War by 
Mark Phillip Bradley and in my in-depth interviews with historian Le Van Lan and archaeologist 
Vu The Long (Bradley 2009, Lan 2016, Long 2016). By asking about these words, I was able to 
consider whether the propagated government terminology had its desired impact of reaching 
“hearts and minds. “ 
 As stated before, these findings were considered alongside the relevant literature’s 
information regarding the popular narrative. 
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Literature Review 
Timeline: War in Vietnam 
 Before embarking reflection of Vietnam’s history, a very brief reminder of this history is 
in order. 
 
(Image 1.2-Vietnam Timeline-Whitaker’s 2012) 
I have outlined the relevant historical period, which spans roughly the mid 1940’s to the mid 
1970’s. Recall that the era from 1945 to 1954 was the French Indochina War, where France 
eventually relinquished the control of Vietnam that they had possessed since the mid nineteenth 
century (Whitaker’s 2012). Soon after the French Indochina War, in 1955, began the American 
War in Vietnam, which lasted until 1975 (History.com). Recall these rough historical periods to 
contextualize any dates mentioned in this project. 
A Socialist and Patriotic Mindset 
“Better to conquer hearts than citadels.” 
-Le Loi, 1426  
 
 As building the foundations for a socialist mindset proved to be a trying and deliberate 
process for the Communist Party, so too is developing the best framing to explain this mindset.  
 The organization of the literature review is as follows: I will begin with discussion of the 
impact of Vietnam’s history with foreign occupation, with a focus on French colonialism. Taking 
this history into consideration alongside the information in the next section—regarding 
deliberate and organic unity in Vietnamese culture—together with a note on the consequences of 
bombs and destruction to galvanize support, will progress into the following section on the 
strong sense of duty in Vietnam. Lastly, I will contrast what I have noted about the Vietnamese 
mindset with some components of the respective U.S American mindset. 
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Impact of Eras of Foreign Occupation 
“A sense of Vietnamese national identity…grew in reaction to foreign interventions.” 
-Stanley Karnow 
 
 It is difficult to distill the impact of foreign occupation and influence on Vietnam into one 
or two words. Life experiences, generational differences, personal dispositions create myriad 
interpretations of foreign powers among individuals.  
 Yet, there are some relevant sentiments expressed about the centuries of foreign influence 
that shed some light on the North Vietnamese mindset. In this section, I will share some 
information on expressed attitudes towards the French, as their Western similarity to Americans 
and lengthy history with Vietnam provide a foundation for meaningful analysis of the 
Vietnamese perspective. I will follow with some findings regarding sentiments toward U.S 
American involvement in Vietnam. 
 Many aspects of life under French colonialism in Vietnam were unabashedly abusive. 
The colonial government weaved demeaning behavior into their policy; engaging in many 
dastardly tactics such as addicting the Vietnamese to opium (Karnow 1997). Additionally, 
France strategically divided Vietnam into three different sections: Tonkin-North Vietnam, 
Annam-Central Vietnam, and Cochinchina-South Vietnam (Hunt 2010). 
 Kim Ngoc and Mark Phillip Bradley distill of some of the impacts of this era of 
domination on Vietnamese attitudes, shedding light on two of the particularly lasting offenses of 
the time: humiliation and disunity. Says Bradley (2009), “French domination provoked a class of 
Vietnamese tradition trained in Confucian classics and oriented toward political service to 
engage in an ever deeper and more desperate way to end Vietnam’s humiliating condition.” Not 
only did the era of French occupation prompt a patriotism-based commitment to fighting for 
national sovereignty, but “the fragmentation of colonialism has made the Vietnamese extremely 
sensitive to the issue of organization, and the history of modern Vietnam can be seen as quest for  
đoàn thể,” in English, community or union (Kim 2002). Viewing French colonialism in this way 
begins to explain how its longevity contributed to a mobilized and unified front of Vietnamese 
citizens. 
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 This unity was long-lasting, and existed among citizens as well as along the war front. 
According to a U.S government-commissioned, 1965 report on “Viet Cong” morale, after 
independence from France, many Vietnamese viewed subsequent struggles with the United 
States as “a continuation of the war of independence against the French.” (It is important to note 
that this report was about the Viet Cong, most of whom were from the southern portion of 
Vietnam. Yet, I do believe the findings belong alongside analysis of viewpoints of people in 
North Vietnam. While the Viet Cong was far from the lotus of the revolutionary movement, they 
were receiving instructions and education from the same overseeing body as the North and were 
ultimately hugely important in implementing the agenda of the Viet Minh. Additionally, this 
research was performed talking to Viet Cong POWs. I kept these ideas in mind when considering 
its conclusions (Encyclopædia Britannica).) On a larger scale, many older members of the Viet 
Cong viewed the struggle against the Americans as a part of the struggle to reestablish 
Vietnamese independence, a “struggle between Vietnam’s legitimate leaders and usurpers 
protected by a foreign power” (Donnell, Pauker, Zasloff 1965). Expressing the trials of this era in 
these terms suggests that any outsider attempting to influence Vietnam is not welcome, and that a 
history of defending Vietnam’s national identity produced generations of Vietnamese ready to 
protect their country. It is quintessential to realize that the Vietnamese mind has resisted 
colonization, and that interventionist actions perhaps designed to foster freedom can have the 
exact opposite effect. After centuries of protecting their national identity, Vietnamese resisted 
any international presence oriented towards control.  
 Yet, what of the other players on the word stage? Indeed, U.S action in Vietnam did not 
occur within an international vacuum. Major communist thinkers and activists, such as Vladimir 
Lenin, were well aware of the struggle in the East. During this time, Lenin wrote an essay 
declaring Communist powers’ support for those oppressed and struggling against capitalism 
(Bradley 2009). In the wake of an era where the influence of outsiders served to dehumanize, 
disenfranchise, and divide Vietnamese people, it is not difficult to understand how appealing and 
refreshing it might have felt for an outsider to both validate the Vietnamese struggle and speak in 
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Unity 
“Peasants, workers, and intellectuals all crowded into the ranks of the armed forces of the revolution.” 
-General Vo Nguyen Giap 
 
 The Vietnamese government utilized communist philosophy to foster the development of 
a singleness of mind and of purpose. In analysis of these efforts, a renewal of suspending moral 
bias is essential; Westerners must attempt to temporarily place these biases—in areas such as 
freedom of speech and thought—on our mental backburner. After undertaking this action, a 
logical understanding of the government’s actions during this time is possible. 
1948 Second National Congress of Culture 
 This meeting, and the action it subsequently sprouted, highlight the deep connection 
between language, politics, self, and country. In attendance were high-status artists and 
intellectuals, who enjoyed a liberal intellectual atmosphere until this point. Cognizant of the 
heavy impact of the work of this intelligent class, the Communist Party resolved to alter this 
atmosphere in order to exploit the talent of these individuals for the revolutionary cause. Recall 
that in 1948, Vietnam was in the midst of a war with the French. Consistent with collectivist 
values, artists were encouraged to relinquish the element of self-expression in their art as part of 
a Communist policy some called kháng chiến, kiến quốc, which translates to “nation-building 
resistance” (Kim 2002). While this congress was remembered wistfully by many as the last time 
that Vietnamese intellectuals were allowed to discuss and debate freely, it is important to note 
that members of this class were also in agreement about the intense need to mobilize for the 
cause of national defense and independence (Kim 2002). 
The 1949 Conference of Debate in Việt Bắc 
 While many socialist-focused initiatives were conceptualized at the 1948 conference, the 
1949 conference was where much of the work was undertaken. Artists and intellectuals were 
chosen to front the labor of affecting a region-wide ideological component of the Communist 
party. The agenda of this conference was as follows: 
1. Specify ideological content 
2. Decide on different literary and cultural forms to promote such content 
3. Shape structure of intellectual activities (Kim 2002) 
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“Thus,” as Kim Ngoc Bao Ninh explains, “the time had come to tighten control over intellectuals 
and their activities not only to rein in discussions that might get out of hand but to make sure that 
the tools were available to inspire people to the level of sacrifice necessary for the resistance” 
(Kim 2002). Indeed, propaganda and education are vital for maintaining a group commitment to 
communist values. As the data analysis section will show, sacrifice, or hy sinh in Vietnamese, is 
a highly sentimental, galvanizing term of wartime. Vietnamese officials planned this conference 
with a specific 1949 military campaign in mind; the Party ostensibly knew the level of sacrifice 
that this campaign would require. 
“Văn nghệ nhân dân”;“Cách mạng hóa tư tưởng, quần chúng hóa sinh hoạt” 
“People’s literature and art”;“Revolutionize ideology, popularize activities” 
 
 These two phrases describe some of the aforementioned labor of converting a society to 
a more socialist mindset. The Communist Party was undertaking a substantial task: redefining 
people’s view of self. Revolutionizing art required a critical analysis of art forms, artists’ chosen 
perspectives, and their subjects.  
 One occurrence of this conference, the artistic transition of Nguyễn Đình Thi, serves as 
a bridge of understanding from an individualist mindset towards a collectivist one. According to 
Communist critics of Thi, his poetry was “outdated, dark, and complex” (Kim 2002). Though he 
possessed a poetic voice that might be accepted by a Western audience, Thi was encouraged to 
rethink his style because “his poetry is a reflection of part of his soul rather than the voice of the 
masses” (Kim 2002). While much of the resistance struggle of Vietnam was indeed painful, 
words of pain that were deemed “non-legitimate” were thought to be irreconcilable with the 
sentiments of the public struggle (Kim 2002). 
 As Ngoc explains, Party culture authority Tố Hữu had the final say. Hữu asserted that 
while he himself understood Thi’s poetry, appreciating the sad and wistful tone and even 
acknowledged that he empathized with the feelings it expressed, Thi’s work was not 
motivational (Kim 2002). Staging a revolution requires work. Hữu pointed out that he could not 
use “I” as criteria of whether or not a poem is good, but poetry must rather be evaluated based on 
the public perception and subsequent reaction (Kim 2002). As Kim poignantly notes, poets were 
losing control over the direction of their work while simultaneously being put in charge of so 
much more, now finding themselves key components of their nation’s revolution (Kim 2002). 
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 Analyzing the initiatives enacted at these conferences allows for insight into some 
components of the philosophy of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Namely, I noted the 
indication of a deep acknowledgement to artists and intellectuals as key tools to reach the masses 
and establishing ideologies and narratives. Additionally, as controlling public thought and 
dialogue is as controversial as it is difficult, these conferences indicate a Party understanding that 
liberation was important enough to warrant censoring the work of the intelligent class.  
 The Party ostensibly viewed the work of education in a similar utilitarian light. As Kim 
explains, by 1951, it was widely understood that “the party must take the offensive, explicitly 
and concretely, in thought reform policy, as it moved to prepare for…eventual victory” (2002). 
The educational happenings of this time also provide insight into people’s considerable 
dedication to thought reform policy. Some politically indoctrinated students began organizing 
“struggle sessions” (Kim 2002). These sessions, that frequently turned violent, occurred when 
students attempted to correct the potentially counterrevolutionary thoughts of their peers. This 
practice employed impactful rhetoric, calling students who behaved unacceptably Việt gian, or 
“traitor” (Kim 2002). 
 In fact, similar rhetoric was noted in the report on 1965 Viet Cong morale. In order to 
keep the ranks of the Viet Cong both unified and deeply committed to the cause, “backwardness 
[was] prohibited,” “backwardness” referring to activities that can be viewed as individualistic or 
selfish. These examples speak to the immense power of stigmatization and critique among the 
Vietnamese, a phenomenon that has been noted by Bob Chenoweth, a veteran of the American 
War in Vietnam and a former Prisoner of War at Hỏa Lò Prison. Chenoweth amazingly credits 
his time in captivity at the “Hanoi Hilton” as the time when he “began understanding another 
race” (Kernan 1978). Perhaps his experiences can speak to some of the cross-cultural 
understanding that this research aims for. According to Chenoweth, “they [the prison guards] 
didn’t like it when we fought because it was the first rule that you can’t change people’s minds 
with force. Criticism, peer pressure, is very important in their society, but we don’t have that, it 
means zip to us” (Kernan 1978). Indeed, these social mechanisms of the Vietnamese mindset 
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People’s War 
“…this invincible weapon which is people’s war.” 
-General Vo Nguyen Giap 
 
 In an interview with Deutsche Welle international news, historian Derek Frisby called 
Vo Nguyen Giap ‘a master of revolutionary war’ (Domínguez 2013). Not only was Giap credited 
for ousting the French and Americans from Vietnam, but he was renowned as a brilliant military 
theorist. In a popular 1970 work Military Art of People’s War, Giap explores some core 
questions and key strategies of the “People’s War” approach.  
 He begins a section entitled “People’s Army, People’s War” with a head-on analysis of 
the question “Why were the Vietnamese people able to win?” (against the French—recall that the 
U.S War in Vietnam was still occurring) (Giap 1970).  In Giap’s words, “the Vietnamese people 
were able to win because their war of liberation was a people’s war” (Giap 1970). In subsequent 
paragraphs, Giap explores the “People’s War” concept, citing familiar ideas regarding the 
steadfast determination and tireless unity of the People’s Army. He summarizes “People’s 
Army” in this way: “the Vietnam army [is] a child of the people. The people, in return, give it 
unsparing affection and support. Therein lies the inexhaustible source of its power” (Giap 1970). 
Comparing the more ambivalent mindset of the United States military with a force of such 
deeply engrained unity and an “inexhaustible source of…power,” contextualizes the North 
Vietnamese military victory. Giap also underlines the importance of the “mutual affections of 
brother-in-arms” and the work of propaganda and education amongst the masses as vitally 
important for sustaining revolutionary fervor (1970). Giap reiterates the importance of the 
Vietnam People’s Army comprising members of all classes, a “worker peasant alliance” with an 
ultimate goal of securing national independence (1970). 
 Equally important strategically is cultivating a long-term orientation within the 
revolutionary force (Giap 1970). As expressed in the Viet Cong morale report, for many 
members of the military, winning the fight against America meant exhausting America’s troops. 
The following conversation was a common one amongst researchers and Viet Cong POWs. 
Reports the Rand Corporation (1965): 
 
“We asked how long they thought the war would last. Many said they thought it 
would be a long war, but some said “It cannot last very much longer now.” When 
- 21 - | P a g e  
 
we asked, “What do you think will be the outcome?” a frequent answer was, “The 
war will continue until one side becomes worn out.” When we probed further, “Do 
you see one side getting tired yet?” the answer tended to be, “Yes, and it’s not our 
side.” 
Rallying Includes All Classes 
 Walking the streets of Hanoi today, it is not uncommon to see what most Americans 
would immediately identify as “propaganda” of the legendary historical figure Ho Chi Minh. 
This is as evident in his grandiose and meticulously attended mausoleum as it is in street art that 
evokes familial appreciation for “Uncle Ho’s” deep commitment to his people. 
 
(Image 1.3-Street Art of Ho Chi Minh. Photo taken by Maggie Norsworthy) 
 
 One influential address from Ho Chi Minh provides some insight into the Vietnamese 
people’s respect and affection for this figure, as well as the power of revolutionary rhetoric to 
reach people of all classes. Says “Uncle Ho,” 
  
“Dear Fellow Countrymen! National salvation is the common cause of our 
entire people. Every Vietnamese must take part in it. He who has money 
will contribute his money, he who has strength will contribute his strength, 
he who has talent will contribute his talent” (Hunt 2010). 
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 Indeed, this quote not only exemplifies the sense of duty instilled in citizens, but the 
notion that traditional indicators of power or status were not required in order to contribute to the 
country’s liberation. For one other example of the depth of Vietnamese commitment to the 
revolutionary cause from all levels of society, one need not look farther than a 2000 obituary for 
former Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. Where most obituaries might note the family members 
that the deceased is survived by, Pham’s was a bit different. Interestingly, there was no public 
information available regarding Pham’s family. This was the result of a deliberate, life-long 
decision by Pham in order to send the message that he was primarily loyal to the revolutionary 
cause. In a culture where family ties have a deep significance, Pham’s choice demonstrates an 
extremely deep level of commitment. 
 Indeed, towards Vietnamese from every walk of life, the Communist Party aimed to 
garner increasing power over thought and action, encouraging full-fledged support of the 
revolution from all citizens. Standing up against the French—and later the United States, Japan, 
and China—required nothing less than full commitment from all facets of the nation. Yet, there 
existed additional external factors that undoubtedly underscored message preached by the party, 
assuring Vietnamese that their country needed reform. These factors included artillery 
bombardment from the U.S.  
 
Other exacerbating factors: bombs and loss  
“For the first time in a generation armed and unarmed peasants have arisen in Vietnam to press their 
demands...” 
-Edourd Daladier (Karnow 1997) 
 
 Bombs, for all the devastation they foster, have an uncanny tendency to mobilize or 
even revolutionize the afflicted population. Henry Grabar (2013) uses the example of the U.S 
bombing of Cambodia—which spanned 8 years and included 2.7 million tons of explosives—to 
illustrate the impact of explosives on community sentiment towards those dropping the bombs. 
According to journalist Richard Dudman, the bombing and the shooting "was radicalizing the 
people of rural Cambodia and was turning the country into a massive, dedicated, and effective 
rural base" (Grabar 2013). In the case of Cambodia, some literature even argues that one effect 
of this destruction was a population prepared to foster the rise to power of the genocidal Pol Pot. 
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 But in Vietnam, according to the morale report, artillery and aerial bombardment led to 
intense hatred towards Americans at a hugely significant rate. Be it heuristics or the truth, Viet 
Cong members claimed that “when one innocent peasant is killed, ten rise in his place; when ten 
are killed, one hundred will rise up” (Donnell, Pauker, Zasloff 1965). Throughout the war, as the 
U.S showered Vietnam in bombs and artillery, they were quite possibly strengthening both the 
resolve and the number of troops to defeat.  
Duty and Defense 
 As stated previously, it is evident that the context of French occupation as well as the 
importance of unity and collectivism in Vietnamese culture led to both a propensity for 
Communist philosophy and a deeply impactful duty to defend Vietnam on a national scale.  
 One important rhetorical device that I came across was hy sinh or “sacrifice” (Bradley 
2009). I will elaborate more on Vietnamese reflections on this term in my analysis, but for now it 
is important to note that Vietnamese people tended to associate this term with a high degree of 
respect, a high sense of duty, and a specifically national orientation. During wartime, the ruling 
party also took deliberate, public action to foster a feeling of honor surrounding war martyrs, or 
liệt sĩ. (Bradley 2009). Again, recall the blurred line between civilian and military in Vietnam. 
As referenced in Ho Chi Minh’s inspirational address, all members of society, not just the rich or 
powerful, were explicitly encouraged and expected to contribute what they had to the war.  
 Vo Nguyen Giap echoes these sentiments: “to resist the American aggression, arms in 
hand, for the sake of national salvation, is the most sacred duty of every Vietnamese patriot, of 
every Vietnamese people” (Giap 1970). The power of this rhetoric is quite apparent. A people’s 
war is a very specific kind of war; those not officially affiliated with the military were incredibly 
important. These “people” were mothers, honored for their willingness to send their sons to fight 
for the cause and families, who fed and took care of soldiers in their own homes. Most strikingly, 
these people were Vietnamese in rural villages who literally took “arms in hand” to support the 
revolutionary cause as guerilla fighters (Giap 1970). 
 Those in the traditional army, of course, were also “ready for the supreme sacrifice,” and, 
according to the Rand report, “the most articulate and committed communist prisoners 
interviewed by us stressed the voluntarism of the movement and pointed out that you cannot 
make a revolutionary fighter of a person dragooned into service” (Hunt 2010; Donnell, Pauker, 
Zasloff 1965). While some North Vietnamese were drafted into fighting, the vigor of the 
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sentiments of these Viet Cong POWs seem to echo the observations of Chenoweth, that 
Vietnamese culture deeply reflected the notion that “you can’t change people’s minds by force” 
(Kernan 1978). 
Differences in Military Morale: The U.S Army versus the Vietnam People’s Army 
 In addition to profiling the willingness of the army to make sacrifices for the sake of the 
country, the reports on Viet Cong morale shed light on specific measures taken by the Vietnam 
People’s Army to build and sustain dedication to the revolutionary cause. Overall, perhaps in a 
nod to the Buddhist monks many associate with Vietnam, the Rand observers noted a “monkish 
solidarity” among the Viet Cong. The POWs interviewed provided insight into the internal 
organization of the army that both cultivated morale and constantly renewed a uniform 
commitment to their cause. In daily meetings, Viet Cong units discussed specific topics: the 
general spirit or morale of the unit; the internal unity and solidarity of the unit; the external unity 
(between the unit and the civilian population); frugality; and an evaluation of the work 
performance since the last meeting and allocation of jobs for the next day (Donnell, Pauker, 
Zasloff 1965). Additionally, units implemented a “buddy system,” dividing into groups of three 
soldiers. These units were impressively effective for political indoctrination as well as a 
“psychological prophylaxis” against the trying tension and anxiety of wartime (Donnell, Pauker, 
Zasloff 1965). I point out the effectiveness because, though the Viet Cong objectively fought in 
deeper material squalor than the already difficult conditions facing the U.S army, Viet Cong 
Prisoners of War repeatedly stated that they “live gloriously and die splendidly.” These team- 
and morale- building policies seem to be extraordinarily effective within the Vietnamese forces 
(Donnell, Pauker, Zasloff 1965). Additionally, according to historian Le Van Lan, soldiers of the 
U.S American Army required significantly more rations during wartime than did the Vietnam 
People’s Army (Lan 2016). Perhaps, again, this was related to morale and commitment to their 
cause. 
 Some observations from this report illicit an explicit contrast with the respective U.S 
military mentality. According to one Viet Cong POW, in a sentiment that once again nods at the 
observations of Chenoweth as a POW, “they fight only for pay…we are fighting for the just 
cause” (Donnell, Pauker, Zasloff 1965). While U.S American soldiers were oftentimes plagued 
with moral dilemmas and ambiguities about the war’s purpose, while young people were burning 
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their draft cards and millions were protesting the war efforts from the U.S, while it seemed for 
many that they would rather do anything else than fight in the Vietnam War, the fighters of the 
Viet Cong apparently “[saw] no option but to keep on fighting” (Goure, Russo, Scott 1966). 
 That leads to what some might perceive as fallbacks of the American military mentality 
during this period. Hopefully the contents of this report thus far have illustrated the various 
forces that combined to create a passionate and mobilized North Vietnamese wartime mindset. 
And indeed, as the Rand report indicates, this insight that was a surprise to many Americans in 
the 1960’s. This report demonstrates that the U.S’s adversaries were well aware of our growing 
weaknesses. And North Vietnam’s military strategy, General Giap’s “People’s War,” was 
partially contingent upon impending American fatigue. Perhaps this explains why one veteran in 
my focus group did not find it accurate to call Vietnam “tired” of foreign presence, as much of 
Vietnam’s war strategy seemed to hinge, rather, on the U.S’s increasing exhaustion.  
 Ultimately, as Karnow (1997) astutely summarizes, “American strategists [had] an 
ignorance of Vietnam’s history, a long and torturous series of conflicts and accommodations that 
gave the Vietnamese a profound sense of their own identity.” This sense of identity revealed 
itself time and time again throughout my data collection. 
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Research Findings and Analysis 
 
 I will now provide two diagrams I conceived through reflection on my surveys and my 
literature review in light of one another. As capturing a “mindset” is a task requiring inherent 
flexibility, these diagrams might smooth the transition between some of the concepts of the 
literature review and of the field research. 
 
Figure 1.3- Venn Diagram relating Duty and hy sinh (sacrifice) 
 This Venn diagram illustrates the overlap of: my findings when asking Hanoians about the word 
“hy sinh” (sacrifice) and my secondary research regarding a North Vietnamese sense of duty. 
This diagram should serve to show how (at least in the war context), Hanoian civilians, the 
military, and the government seem to agree that duty and sacrifice for the good of the country go 
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Figure 1.4- Venn diagram relating North Vietnamese war strategy and impressions of unity 
This Venn diagram outlines my findings when comparing literary research on Vietnamese 
concepts of unity with survey research on perceptions of North Vietnam’s strongest wartime 
strategy. Overwhelmingly, people cited “unity” as the most important strategy, even if it was 
mentioned amongst more specific military strategies. Thus, the significant overlap of the two 
circles. The text in the middle of the circles gives some general examples of government 
mechanisms used to foster nationwide unity during wartime. 
*I had some difficulty classifying guerilla warfare. I came to think it could be understood as both 
embodying the deepest example of civilian commitment or an example of the flexibility in 
divisions between civilian and military during wartime in Vietnam as compared to the US. 
 
 My research—both primary and secondary—has allowed me to identify what I think are 
some key components of the North Vietnamese war mindset and historical perspective. The 









-government rhetoric/ propaganda/ 
education 
-“People’s War” 






Strongest part of North 
Vietnam’s wartime strategy? 
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findings. Therefore, I will use similar organizational categories to present my interview and 
survey findings, hopefully adding some depth, context, and humanity to my findings in literature. 
 It was my initial focus group that made me realize that while I was hoping for a more 
general view on war, I would find the most information and perspective regarding the experience 
of the American War in Vietnam. However, as America is a foreign superpower to Vietnam, the 
history of foreign occupation cannot be disregarded and is immensely impactful in the 
Vietnamese perspective. 
Impact of Foreign Occupation 
 According to one survey taker, on the question of the importance of history to 
Vietnamese people in their generation, history represents the “tradition to build the country and 
keep the country of Vietnamese people.” Applying this to the question of rhetoric and 
mobilizing, history becomes a highly politicized, deliberately employed and experienced 
component of Vietnamese thinking; particularly for the ultimate goal of “building” and 
“keeping” Vietnam. Considering how much of Vietnamese history is mired in defense against 
foreign aggressors, it becomes clear how the past can rise to increased relevance in times of 
conflict. 
 Additionally, the Vietnamese viewpoint towards foreign aggressors in the past is a 
fruitful realm in which to consider rhetorical choices. In an early interview with Le Van Lan, 
while introducing my topic, I referred to the war in question with the name I always had: “The 
Vietnam War.” This seemingly introductory comment launched our conversation into the realm 
of questioning rhetoric, with considering the impact of my calling the war “The Vietnam War.” 
 Polarizing wartime rhetoric has been employed throughout Vietnamese history, 
beginning with naming the conflicts themselves. When Vietnam was struggling against French 
domination, the conflict was popularly called “kháng chiến chống thực dân Pháp” which 
translates to “the war of resistance against the colonialist French.” Later, when Vietnam and the 
United States were engaged in war, the conflict was referred to by a similar title, “kháng chiến 
chống Mỹ, cứu nước.” This roughly translates to “resistance war against the imperialist 
Americans, to save the country.” Now, pausing here, momentarily suspending whether we think 
this sentiment is valid, it is easy to see that simply referring to a conflict with such strong 
language can impact the national conversation about this conflict.  
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 I encountered similar language during my visit to Hỏa Lò prison, also known to prisoners 
of war as the “Hanoi Hilton.” The prison site, now a popular museum, gives some insight into 
the way history is explained to Hanoians and tourists alike. One section of the museum was 
devoted to the experiences of American pilots that were held in Hỏa Lò as Prisoners of War 
during the American War in Vietnam, and the language used to describe the era is quite telling. 
For instance, in a video display explaining the American escalation of the war from 1964, the 
English subtitles explain that not only were the U.S. government’s actions “extremely dangerous 
moves up the war ladder,” but also “threaten[ed] even the world’s peace and security” (Hỏa Lò 
2016). Additionally, in a panel providing an introduction to the United States-focused section of 
the museum, the opening sentence establishes a similar perspective: “The United States 
government carried out sabotage warfare by using their air and naval forces against the North of 
Vietnam.” (Hỏa Lò 2016). These examples provide some insight into another contribution to the 
national conversation about this conflict. 
Unity as War Strategy: People’s Perspective 
The War in Vietnam was realized not by cannon, by gun, by soldier…but the most important part 
of this was propaganda and education.” 
-Le Van Lan (2016) 
 
 My field research brought the findings of my literature review to life. When conducting 
my focus group, for example, patriotism and determination were unanimously cited as the most 
important part of North Vietnam’s wartime strategy.  
 My random oral surveying further substantiated these sentiments, reiterating the 
importance of both civilian and military efforts during the war and shedding some light on the 
people that bore the brunt of wartime losses. One participant’s quote provides a citizen’s opinion 
on the government’s role during wartime: “We need the government to regulate the activities of 
citizens, organize protests, [and] guide people.” This citizen’s perspective challenges the notion 
that the government’s control over Vietnam is unwanted. In fact, especially during wartime, 
Vietnamese people expressed to me a very deep devotion to their nation, sometimes at the price 
of personal freedom. Hanoians are proud of their nation’s ability to rally for defense: “[the] spirit 
of unity is very important;” “parents, children, everyone participated in war.” Expressed in 
Vietnamese, “toàn dân kháng chiến” or “kháng chiến toàn dân,toàn diện, rường kỳ” meaning, 
respectively “all people for the resistance,” and “all generations for the resistance.”  




“Vietnamese people love the country so much. Every time the invaders come, the patriotism intertwines 
and becomes the wave to engulf the invaders.” 
Focus group member, April 8th 2016 
 
 Gaining insight directly from Vietnamese people about their morale and attitude during 
wartime was very revealing of the impact of the government’s rhetoric on the citizens’ 
vocabulary and worldview. Amongst my sample, comprising mostly people who answered the 
surveys independently of discussion with one another, I heard many repeated phrases. For 
example, when asking people about the roles of people they knew during wartime, I heard the 
phrase “protect the country” multiple times. This is very powerful rhetoric. Not only does it 
imply a high degree of perceived political efficacy from the citizenry, but it implies that the war 
was one of defense and protection. This is an idea that is easy to rally around. Easier, for 
example, than the U.S’ escalation of the war, clandestine bombings, all in the context of an 
uncontrolled arena for free speech where dissatisfaction with the war could be expressed. On one 
hand, this suggests an epistemological divide between Vietnam and the U.S: one nation attempts 
to create truth through the transmissions of the government while the viewpoint of the other has 
the chance to marinate in a somewhat liberal public sphere and be massaged by the agenda of the 
government. Now, taking this comparison strictly from a strategic standpoint, it represents one 
facet of Vietnam’s ability to mobilize behind this war: not only was their motive more easily 
articulated, but it had a more direct and influential channel through which it was transmitted.  
Rhetoric: People’s Perspective 
 As previously noted, as part of my field research, I asked people for their connotations 
and reflections on Vietnamese words and phrases I encountered in my literature review. I hoped 
to glean a sense of how the words were used specifically in a war context. Below are some of the 
most common and most interesting responses I received about different terms: 
 
Nhân Dân- “the people” 
 
 -“Vietnamese people were like heroes.” 
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 -“[during war, Nhân Dân experienced] suffering, lacking of things and family had to 
suffer the damage.” 
 -“patriotism…” 
 -“heart has sentiment, protection, support, always give strength and confidence, citizen, 
respectful, sacred/spiritual, beloved…” 
 
 I first came across this term in Vietnam at War (Bradley 2009). When asking Le Van Lan 
about the term, his answer evidenced both Vietnamese unity and the Vietnamese perspective on 
propaganda and communism. Nhân dân is a term very commonly employed by the Communist 
party; it is, in fact, the name of the party’s official newspaper. Figures such as Ho Chi Minh and 
General Giap oftentimes evoked rhetoric about how the Communist party and the government 
“served” nhân dân, even going as far as to call the government a “slave” to the people. 
According to Le Van Lan, people understand the employment of this slogan, “are happy about 
it,” and are subsequently likely to do what the government asks of them. To illustrate the widely-
encompassing sentiments behind both nhân dân and hy sinh, Le Van Lan shared a story of a poor 
family in Quang Tri province whose house sustained significant war damage. Upon “receiving 
the title nhân dân,” the family’s commitment to the war effort was reinvigorated; they donated 
brick and other materials from their home to build a road for the Vietnam People’s Army.  
 
Hy sinh- “sacrifice” 
-“willingness to die to protect country” 
-“die for protection of nation, die for citizens, willingness to give up anything like death, life, or 
resource” 
-“deny individual purpose and focus on collective actions of nation—would do anything during 
wartime.” 
-“gift of individual to contribute to protest, [for the sake of] national security, lots of youth die in 
the military, but the family feels proud.” 
-“willingness and respected duty of all citizens when country is in trouble” 
-“it is a privilege to sacrifice for the country” 
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 Among the most striking aspects of these definitions are the words I underlined, which 
suggest not only a tolerance or acceptance of the possibility of dying for the country, but a 
“willingness” to do so, even calling sacrificing a “privilege” or“gift.” These quotes speak to the 
morale of the Vietnamese people, but also of the collectivist nature of the Vietnamese mindset: a 
literal “deny[ing] of individual purpose.” This calls to mind and brings context to the experience 
of Nguyễn Đình Thi at the 1949 Conference of Debate in Việt Bắc. Though poetry with a self-
focused or emotionally indulgent purpose can be refreshing and relatable, if the work of artists 
and intellectuals has the impact on the society that the Communist Party says it does, the quotes 
might exemplify some success stories of the Communist party controlling the public 
conversation. Indeed, consider the sentiments expressed by ordinary Hanoians in 2016 alongside 
those expressed by the previously mentioned General Giap (1970) in his explanation of People’s 
War “to resist the American aggression, arms in hand, for the sake of national salvation, is the 
most sacred duty of every Vietnamese patriot, of the entire Vietnamese people.” The two 
different contexts, decades apart, employ remarkably similar rhetoric. Comparing this rhetorical 
arena with U.S sentiments during this time highlights both the difference in control over public 
dialogue between the U.S and Vietnam and the difference in dedication and attitude towards the 
war. 
 
Cuộc kháng chiến chống Mỹ, cứu nước- The War Against Imperialist America, to Save the 
Country 
-“the just cause” 
-“the proud of the nation and the illustrious victory” 
-“it was certain to be successful” 
-“the loss of so many people was unnecessary” 
-“that was the long fight of Vietnamese people. It created the significant loss for Vietnam in 
terms of property and the people.” 
 
 Lastly, the way that the Vietnamese government and people refer to the war itself is 
telling. When I originally chose to ask people about this term, I was expecting more of an 
acknowledgement of the obviously partisan nature of this title. There was no such talk. In fact, 
most sentiments expressed about this war were basically unanimous. What I was most interested 
in was the different understanding of objective “facts” of the war, many of which were in direct 
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opposition to the narrative I had grown up hearing. When asked, for example, if the United 
States was “invading” or “intervening” in South Vietnam in the 70’s, not a single respondent said 
the U.S’s actions served as a positive intervention. If they even mentioned the word intervention, 
it was to express a thought that started something like “the United States may have thought they 
were intervening, but…”  
 In this same sentiment were many of the answers I received when asking if my 
participants felt a strong popular support for the North Vietnamese cause during this war.  
 
-“people from all over the world supported Vietnam in the war against America” 
-“Vietnamese people altogether supported the fight against America to protect the country.” 
-“yes, because the war was ill-gotten.” 
-“we didn’t want the war to happen, but because we were invaded we had to fight to protect the 
country.” 
-“The support from Russia and other socialist countries” 
-“People, friends from all over the world supported Vietnamese people against the empire 
invaders.” 
 
 These quotes characterize an important layer of the Vietnamese standpoint towards war, 
one that can be enlightening when pondering Vietnam’s historical war victories; the history of 
war in Vietnam is largely one of defense. Hanoians told me over and over again, in reference to 
both themselves and their government, that Vietnamese people hate war. Yet it is this same 
force, the force of patriotism and communalism and unity, that both fuels their strong distaste for 
wars and fuels the logic and morale that ultimately tends to propel them to technical victory in 
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The Language of Loss: Who won the war? 
 There’s a reason I say “technical victory.” One element of my research was to explore the 
ways people talk about war and possibly begin to expose limits of this vernacular. I was 
particularly interested in the word “lose” in the case of this war. By all traditional definitions of 
the word “lose,” the United States “lost” the war in Vietnam. Yet, I have found that particularly 
in an educational setting, it is not uncommon to witness Americans skirting around this language, 
describing the end of the American War in Vietnam as a “withdrawal” rather than a “defeat.” At 
the same time, in other countries, I found that there was no hesitation to call the American War 
in Vietnam a loss, hard and fast. I noted additional nuances of the word “lose” when asking 
people in Vietnam who won and lost the war. Most people I spoke to who experienced the 
American War in Vietnam said, in so many words, one of two answers. 
“The Americans lost the war but Vietnam lost so much more” or 
“No one wins in war, and the people lose the most.” 
 
I then checked with a bilingual friend regarding the flexibility of the word “loss”- wondering if, 
like in English, the word could be used to describe both the outcome of a war and the action of 
losing a life or property. It turns out that, like in English, this is the case in Vietnamese.  When I 
think, then, about the flexibility of this word, I think about the possibilities for fitting our speech 
about war more accurately to the human dimension of war. By that I mean, thinking deeply about 
the fact that rigid terminology—and the rigid logic it fosters—might not always be appropriate; 
for war is ultimately a series of human interactions that, even if they combine for some larger 
purpose within the war narrative, ultimately end up affecting these same humans the most.  
  




 A quintessential lesson from this research is an endorsement of the simplicity of its 
methods: the best way to learn about life during the American War in Vietnam is to talk to 
people about their lives during the American War in Vietnam. This process is smoothed by 
attempting to suspend political and moral bias regarding relations between the U.S and Vietnam 
at this time. 
 It is important to acknowledge the more subtle and complex dimensions of this inquiry. 
 On a larger scale, this project is an attempt to navigate a pursuit for truth when the topic 
at hand has multiple “truths” and possibly sensitive consequences for those involved. Thanks to 
support from the academic staff, the openness of Vietnamese people, and the length of time that 
has passed since this war occurred, my month in Hanoi presented an opportune situation to 
pursue such analysis. 
 For North Vietnam, “People’s War” was a thoughtful and successful wartime strategy. 
Due to centuries of foreign occupation that allowed revolutionary sentiment and wartime 
readiness to fester, a sense of Vietnamese unity that is as historical as it is manufactured, the 
galvanizing impact of bombs and other attacks, and a deep sense of duty and defense, North 
Vietnam had an “inexhaustible” source of energy and dedication from both military members 
and civilians during this conflict (Giap 1970). Additionally, a heavy government hand in the 
public conversation, inspirational Vietnamese leaders, and support and rhetoric from the global 
Communist movement helped sustain the nation’s energy during a conflict that was “won” by 
outlasting the opponent.  
 The two opening quotes of the introduction illustrate the potential downfalls of ignoring 
the successes and realities of North Vietnam’s wartime strategy: the first pointing to the 
problems of government policy that is based on “impressions” and “intuitions” and the second to 
the problems when the popular historical narrative is in fact “ahistorical.” While it can be 
tempting to transmit our own versions of truth to others, it is vitally important to understand as 
many sides of history as deeply as we can, to allow them to provide nuances to our own analysis, 
to ultimately strengthen our own views and to promote diplomacy. There is certainly a time for 
politics, a time for debating morals, but I believe that there is a danger in beginning these actions 
too early in our analysis. Therefore, I invite readers to suspend moral bias. 
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  By committing to an approach based on constructivism, epistemology, and subsequently 
rhetoric, increased holistic understanding of this period of history is possible. This analysis 
allows a deeper look into words that might signal fear to Americans, allowing words like 
Communism to be contextualized into Vietnam’s deeply historical and community-oriented 
relationship with this philosophy. Readers may judge for themselves whether or not North 
Vietnam’s actions were morally excusable, but to dismiss them before full consideration the 
Vietnamese context is irresponsible. Lastly, a human-based analysis of this war may prove a 
wise model for other international conflicts—a reminder that the quarreling nations are, in fact, 
composed of people. A commitment to this analytical orientation when thinking about war can 
provide richness to questions of “winning” and “losing,” challenging our familiar rhetoric to 
better suit the complex realities of war. 
Limits 
 This work would undoubtedly improve had I a greater knowledge of the Vietnamese 
language. Not only would this ability have improved my sense of subtleties and patterns of 
rhetoric in my participants’ speech, but it would have likely enhanced the information I could 
find for my literature review as well. I am grateful, then, for the scholars who have chosen to 
publish their work in English, as I am grateful to those multilingual individuals who have 
translated Vietnamese content for an English-speaking audience. Perhaps focusing on rhetoric 
was a naïve oversight; for it can indeed prove difficult to deepen analysis of a language you do 
not speak. However, thanks to the fortune of being connected to many individuals with an 
extensive grasp of both English and Vietnamese, I was able to get more information on those 
subtleties that I did catch. 
 Regarding my field research, there were many opportunities for bias. For example, there 
is a possibility that the citizens of Hanoi who choose to spend time in the public area of Hoan 
Kiem Lake differ substantially from those who do not. In the same vein, I experienced some 
people who refused to answer my questionnaire; some older, some government affiliated, and 
some who claimed they did not know enough to talk to me about the war. This suggests more 
potential for bias; perhaps there is a difference in opinion between those who are willing to 
engage with a Western stranger about war and those who are not. Additionally, an unexpected 
time restraint from Hanoi University rendered it difficult to gather more than 26 interviews. 
While I feel confident that those 26 questionnaires combined with my other field research 
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provided fruitful insight into the Vietnamese mindset, my survey population was a tiny subset of 
the population. In general, the time constraints of this research period could have hindered my 
ability to reach a certain level of depth on this topic. Lastly, there is always a possibility of social 
desirability bias, where respondents might have censored their answers to cater to their 
perceptions of what I was hoping to hear.  
Further Research 
 I believe that a subsequent study with mirroring methodology regarding American 
rhetoric of this war would be deeply informative. David Sutton’s The Rhetoric of the Vietnam 
War: An Annotated Bibliography points at many articles which analyze U.S American rhetorical 
choices, such as the controversially manipulated Tonkin Gulf narrative, and the pertinence of the 
use of ‘aggressor’-focused language to describe the potential spread of Communism. Though I 
was unable to gain access to many of these articles, I believe that this review could lead to 
fruitful follow up research and a chance to put my own culture in this same light. 
 In terms of this study, as stated before, a deeper analysis of Vietnamese linguistics would 
provide additional richness to these findings.  
 Were I to continue this line of inquiry, I would expand my focus of study to include more 
of the non-governmental factors that shape the public’s mindset and the citizenry’s 
conversations. I would spend more time looking at the impact of books, of film, of visual art and 
poems. I am deeply curious to study the results of the Communist Party altering art at the 
conferences I researched.  
 On the U.S American side, war films and literature have a very significant impact on the 
public conversation about this war. Were I to continue pursuing this work, I would be interested 
in both the most accurate and the most impactful of these forms of media for the United States. 
 Ultimately, the deepest curiosities that stemmed from this project were regarding the 
epistemology of experiencing war. There is a fair amount of research regarding veterans’ 
memories, but from my findings, there is much more to explore regarding a philosophical 
approach to this line of inquiry.  
 My initial vision for this work, which was quickly scaled down, was the development of 
an educational syllabus. I envisioned a course that would encourage students to radically 
empathize with the unfamiliar mindsets of this time, a course where the readings were the 
highest quality narratives and the most provocative philosophies from the East and the West, and 
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the lecturers were experienced in connecting over a troubled past. If I have the chance to 
continue rounding out my understandings of the human dimension of war, perhaps this syllabus 
will someday come to fruition. 
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